Anil Kumar, J. - (1.) HEARD Sri Manik Singh, learned counsel for petitioner, learned State Counsel and perused the record.
(2.) FACTS of the present case are that petitioner was initially appointed as contractual employee on the post of Electrical Instructor at Chetriya Gramin Vikas Sansthan, Faizabad for a period of six months on 20.08.1988. Thereafter, the said period was extended time and again, the last contractual appointment of the petitioner was upto 17.10.1992, thereafter the contractual appointment of the petitioner has not been extended, hence present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner for quashing of the oral order of termination dated 17.10.1992. Sri Manik Sinha, learned counsel for petitioner does not dispute the position that the petitioner's last contractual appointment was upto 17.10.1992.
(3.) AS per the undisputed facts of the present case are that the petitioner's last contractual appointment was only upto 17.10.1992 (as admitted by learned counsel for petitioner, Sri Manik Sinha so keeping in view the said facts, as well as law as laid down by Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of Director Institute of Management Development U.P. Vs. Smt. Puspa Srivastava, : J.T. 1992 (4) S.C. 489 wherein the Apex Court held as under: - Para No. 23 - In the instant case, there is no such rule. The appointment was purely ad hoc and on a contractual basis for a limited period. Therefore, by expiry of the period of six months, the right to remain in the post comes to an end. Division Bench of this court in the case of Life Insurance Corporation and another Vs. Sri Rajeev Kumar Srivastava, 1994 (12) LCD held as under: - Para No. 17 - The next submission of the learned counsel of the appellants is that the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Director, Institute of Management Development U.P. (supra) determines the case of the parties may be seen. In this case Honb'le Supreme Court has held that where the appointment is purely on ad hoc basis and is contractual and by efflux of time the appointment comes to an end, the person holding such post can have no right to continue on the said post. We have considered the submissions. The ratio of the judgment of Honb'le the Supreme Court leaves no room for doubt that the petitioner's contractual employment oh daily payment basis having come to end by efflux of time, does not amount to retrenchment. Thus the provision of Section 25(F) of Industrial Disputes Act is also not attracted.;